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Was Nietzsche a sexist, a “male chauvinist,”a misogynist? In the eyes 
of many, Nietzsche is one philosopher for whom the question should 
not even be asked, as if there were any question. Is not Nietzsche surely 
one of the more striking examples o f a  male philosopher perpetuating a 
male-dominated culture by arguing for the inferiority of women? I don’t 
think so. With some trepidation, I would like to  engage this delicate 
matter, and take issue with the claim that Nietzsche’s views on women 
reflect “all-too-human prejudices” which are therefore “philosophically 
irrelevant,”’ and even attempt the impossible: argue for Nietzsche’s 
“feminism”! 
Was Nietzsche a sexist? If “sexism” means a belief in necessary and 
essential differences between the sexes, the answer is a qualified yes. If it 
means a belief in masculine superiority (i.e., “male chauvinism”), the 
answer is definitely no; in fact, a good case can be made for feminine 
superiority. If western culture reflects masculine domination, we will 
see that Nietzsche presents a decidedly “non-western” view of the 
masculine-feminine relation and the priorities disclosed in the nature of 
that relation. 
Like all facets of Nietzsche’s philosophy, his thoughts on woman 
demand a careful reading, with an eye out for links to other aspects of 
his thinking. We will begin with the longest single treatment of the issue 
in Nietzsche’s writings, found in Part Seven of Beyond Good and Evil 
(BGE), sections 231-239.2 Two important points in section 231 must be 
noted at  the outset: (1) He speaks of “woman as such” (Weib an sich), 
not “women.”3 I take this t o  be an  indication that Nietzsche is pursuing 
something deeper than sexual differences. Hereafter, the term“woman” 
is meant t o  be synonymous with “the feminine” (Weiblichkeit), a prin- 
ciple which is neither biological nor sociological but arche~ypal .~ ( 2 )  
Nietzsche identifies the thoughts to come as “my truths.” Some might 
take this t o  be a philosophical disclaimer, or relief for the serious reader, 
i.e., that what follows is a rather idiosyncratic indulgence with no 
importance beyond a subjective profile of the author. But although 
Nietzsche was a playful writer, he was never without serious intention. 
In my view, before we can judge Nietzsche‘s thoughts on woman we 
must first attempt to  see how they fit his thought as a whole. Let us begin 
by quoting a good portion of the sections in question: 
Woman wants to become self-reliant-and for that reason she is beginning to enlighten 
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men about "woman as such": this is one of the worst developments of the general 
uglification of Europe. For what must these clumsy attempts of women at scientific 
self-exposure bringto light! . . . Woe when"theeterna1ly boring in woman"-she is rich in 
that!-is permitted to venture forth! When she begins to unlearn thoroughly and on 
principle her prudence and art-of grace, of play. of chasing away worries, or lightening 
burdens and taking things lightly . . . . 
. . . Is it not in the worst taste when woman sets about becoming scientific that way?So 
far enlightenment of this sort was fortunately man's affair, man's lot . . , . 
. . . But  she does not want truth: what is truth to woman? From the beginning, nothing 
has been more alien, repugnant, and hostile to woman than truth-her great art is the lie, 
her highest concern is mere appearance and beauty. Let us men confess it: we honor and 
love precisely this art and fhis instinct in woman-we who have a hard time and for our 
relief like to associate with beings under whose hands, eyes, and tender follies our 
seriousness, our gravity and profundity almost appear to us like folly. 
We men wish that woman should not go on compromising herself through enlighten- 
ment. , . . I think it is a real friend of women that councels them today: mulier faceat de 
mu/iere! (Woman should be silent about woman). (232) 
. . .  
To go wrong on the fundamental problem of "man and woman", to deny the most 
abysmal antagonism between them and the necessity of an eternally hostile tension. to 
dream perhaps of equal rights, equal education, equal claims and obligations-that is a 
f.vpico/ sign of shallowness . . . . (238) 
. . .  
Wherever the isdustrial spirit has triumphed over the military and aristocratic spirit. 
woman now aspires to the economic and legal self-reliance of a clerk: "woman as clerk"is 
inscribed on the gate to the modern society that is taking shape now. As she thus takes 
possession of new rights, aspires to become"master"and writes the"progress"of woman 
upon her standards and banners, the opposite development is taking place with terrible 
clarity: woman is refrogresing. 
Since the French Revolution. woman's influence in Europe has decreased proportion- 
ately as  her rights and claims have increased; and the "emancipation of woman." insofar 
as that is demanded and promoted by women themselves (and not merely by shallow 
males) is thus seen to be an odd symptom of the increasing weakening and dulling of the 
most feminine instincts. There is sfupidily in this movement, an almost masculine stupid- 
i t y .  . . . 
. . . what is the meaning of all this if not a crumbling of feminine instincts. a 
defeminization? 
To be sure. there are enough imbecilic friends and corrupters of woman among the 
scholarly asses of the male sex who advise woman to defeminize herself in this way and to 
imitate all the stupidities with which"man"in Europe. European"manliness."is sick: they 
would like to reduce woman to the level of"generaleducation,"probably even of reading 
the newspapers and talking about politics . . . . 
. . . Altogether one wants to make her more "cultivated" and, as is said, make the 
weaker sex strong through culture-as if history did not teach us as impressively as 
possible that making men "cu1tivated"and making them weak-weakening. splintering, 
and sicklying over the force o f t h e  will-have always kept pace, and that the most 
powerful and influential women in the world (most recently Napolean's mother) owed 
their power and ascendancy over men to the force of their will-and not to schoolmasters! 
(239) 
A careful reading of these passages, in the light of certain basic 
assumptions in Nietzsche's thought, should lead to  the conclusion that 
this is anything but "male chauvinism," i.e., the belief in the superiority 
of masculine traits. If the "emancipation of women" means "equality," 
that is t o  say, affirming and recommending the participation of women 
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in  "man's world," it is clearly Nietzsche's view that  this represents not  a 
s tep u p  but  in fact a regressive decline a n d  loss of power. If feminine 
traits could be  characterized as: playfulness, adornment ,  instinctive- 
ness, unpredictability, sensuality, nurtur ing (e.g., child rearing); a n d  
masculine traits as: seriousness, rationality, orderliness, de-sensuali- 
zat ion,  productivity (e.g., a "career")-then Nietzsche seems t o  be 
saying that  the repudiat ion of feminine traits in favor  of masculine traits 
is a n  exchange of strength for weakness. In other  words, not only is the  
feminine not  inferior t o  the  masculine. it may be superior  to the  mascu- 
line. According t o  Nietzsche, m a n  is "sick." 
If such a n  interpretat ion is t o  make  sense. we must  d r a w  connect ions 
with certain central Nietzschean themes: ( I )  The primacy of instinct. 
Although Nietzsche never denies the  value of reason, he rejects the  
rationalistic devaluat ion of passion a n d  instinct-not ou t  of s o m e  
shal low romanticism, but because he sees reason a n d  instinct a s  inex- 
tricably linked. Reason  is in the  service of life instincts, the  priority of 
which must therefore always be recognized. ( 2 )  The primac), qf H i l l .  
Nietzsche never abandoned the Schopenhauerian view that  knowledge 
is subordinate  t o  will, that  explanat ion,  measure a n d  order  a r e  epi- 
phenomenal  echoes of a n  inexplicable force of sheer assertion-will. A s  
in the  first instance. knowledge is not without value, it simply does not 
represent t h e  core  of h u m a n  being. (3) Anti-egalitarianism. Nietzsche 
opposed all forms ofequal i ty .  not o n  social or political but philosophi- 
cal g rounds .  All calls f o r  equality, in Nietzsche's eyes. represented 
var ia t ions of t h e  central theme of western metaphysics: the  a t tempt  t o  
t ranscend a world constituted by differences, a n d  therefore, conflict. In 
all facets of his thinking. Kietzsche tried to preserve the  tension of  
differences, because in his view the  essence of reality ( a  process of  
becoming)  is fueled by this tension. (4) The decadence qf' M'estern 
culture. Nietzsche criticizes the  spirit of western civilization because it  
represents a n  inversion of the priorities described above.  T h e  Platonic- 
Chris t ian foundat ion of  the  western mind determined the course of 
culture a n d  history t o  be a cont inuing suppression of"nature"  in favor  
of "spirit." Now in view of the masculine a n d  feminine traits sketched 
earlier, if one  were t o  admi t  a c o m m o n  assumption of "male chauvin- 
ism"-that o u r  cul ture  is a masculine product-then it seems t o  me that  
accusing Nietzsche of misogyny or male chauvinism entirely misses the 
point .  There  never has  been a more  severe critic of western culture t h a n  
Nietzsche. Consequently, Nietzsche can  be seen t o  be one  of the  most 
severe critics of the masculine principle. 
We c a n  pursue this mat ter  f rom another  angle by recalling the central 
theme of  The Birth of Tragedy (BT): the  Dionysian-Apollonian distinc- 
tion, a n d  with it the  issue of t ruth a n d  appearance,  that  which is most 
pertinent t o  our  topic. Assuming the  reader  is somewhat  familiar with 
BT, I will only sketch a bare  outline of the  fundamenta l  issue in that  
work.  
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Nietzsche identifies what he considers to be the two archetypal forces 
controlling the Greek spirit, forces embodied in the deities Dionysus 
and Apollo. Dionysus personifies ecstatic self-transcendence and 
Apollo personifies the principle of individuation; what is portrayed here 
is a cosmic relation consisting of a unified, formless flux (becoming) and 
individuated moments within that flux (being), both of which constitute 
the world-process. For Nietzsche, the early Greeks knew both forces 
well: the cultivation of form and meaning in the plastic and poetic arts, 
and form-shattering annihilation in the ecstatic practises of the mystery 
cults. 
Nietzsche’s view of the world is one in which becoming has priority 
over being. Consequently, he feels that Greek tragedy, which was 
connected with Dionysian religion, represented the culmination of 
Greek genius, and their deepest penetration into the nature of reality. 
The tragedies could affirm individuation and form (the poetic reflection 
of the hero) and yet recognize the priority of the annihilating power of 
flux (the hero’s doom). In other words, the tragic world-view held form 
(the Apollonian) to be “appearance” (a temporary ordering of a pri- 
mordial chaos) which must consequently yield to a formless power (the 
Dionysian) symbolized by the priority of destructive fate in the drama. 
In the tragic age, the Greeks were able to create a world of beauty and 
meaning and yet affirm the inevitable negativity of life, thereby affirm- 
ing life as a whole. 
With the advent of the scientific spirit (personified by Socrates) the 
tragic attunement of Apollo and Dionysus was ruptured. The forces of 
form and formlessness became separated into an antagonistic conflict, 
where the principle of form was given priority. The Socratic search for 
“truth” (i.e., an abiding form beyond appearance and change) repre- 
sents the rejection of the artistic spirit (i.e., the view that form is a 
creation out of an indeterminate chaos, not “truth”). In this way the 
Apollonian principle is severed from the Dionysian, resulting in the 
opposition between reason (form alone) and chaos (mystery and de- 
struction), and the attempt to eliminate or at least devalue the latter. 
According to Nietzsche, with this Platonic inversion of tragic priori- 
ties, where now form takes precedence over formlessness and unchang- 
ing form becomes the criterion for truth, western man begins to be 
alienated from a world constituted by becoming. The ideals of western 
(i.e., post-tragic) culture represent the predominance of Apollonian 
tendencies and the subordination of Dionysian instincts, or even the 
complete devaluation of the Dionysian (either in the other-worldly 
form of Christianity, or the worldly form of scientific rationalism). In 
any case, Nietzsche feels that the consequences are the weakening of 
life-affirming instincts, and the loss of creativity and attunement to a 
world of change. 
Since, for Nietzsche, form is aprocess of creation out of formlessness, 
and is therefore not “substance,” then the Platonic inversion presents 
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not only a philosophical mistake, but also an existential barrier imped- 
ing the appropriate emergence of form-the aesthetic mode of creativ- 
ity. Herein lies the background of Nietzsche’s critique of “truth” and 
promotion of “appearance.” The continuing references to appearance 
in Nietzsche’s writings point back to this central theme of BT form as 
such is appearance; there is no “truth,” other than the annihilation of 
form; “appearance,” that is to say, form which admits its “deceptive” 
character, which yields to the formless, is a more appropriate model of 
reality. Form is not “objective truth”; it is a creation. The world is an 
“aesthetic phenomenon.”5 
If we recall Nietzsche’s characterization of woman in the passages 
quoted earlier, we can begin to see the references to “appearance,”“lie” 
and the repudiation of truth in a new light. And if we could match the 
Apollonian-Dionysian distinction with the masculine-feminine distinc- 
tion, then Nietzsche’s objections to “emancipation”cou1d be translated 
as follows: woman’s equality means (in Nietzsche’s eyes) the adoption of 
masculine traits; defeminization announces the final victory of the 
Apollonian over the Dionysian and completes the degeneration and 
weakening of man. Could it be that “the woman question”represents, 
for Nietzsche, a specific battle in which he fights for the preservation of 
the Dionysian? 
If we could conclusively equate the feminine with the Dionysian, then 
in the context of Nietzsche’s critique of western culture we could argue 
for the “primordiality” of the feminine. To that purpose, let us hear 
more from BGE: 
What inspires respect for woman, and often enough even fear, is her norure, which is 
more “natural” than man’s, the genuine, cunning suppleness of a beast of prey, the tiger’s 
claw under the glove, the naivetiof her egoism, her uneducability and inner wildness, the 
incomprehensibility, scope, and movement of her desires and virtues- 
What, in spite of all fear, elicits pity for this dangerous and beautiful cat “woman” is 
that she appears to suffer more, to be more vulnerable, more in need of love, and more 
condemned to disappointment than any other animal. Fear and pity: with these feelings 
man has so far confronted woman, always with one foot in tragedy which tears to pieces as 
it enchants. (239) 
We are clearly reminded of the “nature vs. culture” tragic tension in 
BT. In BGE, section 231, Nietzsche says: “Woman is essentially 
unpeaceful, like a cat.” In one of his later writings, Nietzsche says that 
woman “tears to pieces” when she loves, and calls women “maenads.*% 
These are surely Dionysian references. In that same work he tells us that 
he“knows women”because of his “Dionysian dowry,”and calls himself 
in that context the “first psychologist of the eternally feminine.*7 
These references suggest that Nietzsche considered the feminine and 
the Dionysian to be closely linked if not synonymous. We can further 
elucidate this association by briefly addressing the context of Dionysian 
worship in ancient Greece. 
The cult of Dionysus was the most successful “Titanic” counter- 
weight to “Olympian” worship, in the sense that it represented elements 
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of nature mysticism and ecstatic self-transcendence to balance the “sky” 
imagery, moderation and de-naturalization personified in Olympian 
religion. The respective notions of immortality speak to this point: 
Olympian immortality meant freedom from death; Dionysian immor- 
tality meant continual death and rebirth. In this way, Dionysian 
mythology expressed the cyclic regeneration of nature, the destruction 
and reconstruction of life forms. Consequently, Dionysian worship 
embraced the “dark,” destructive side of life in order to receive the 
blessings which stem from harmonizing the self with a necessary cosmic 
force. The essence of Dionysian religion consisted in the realization that 
although nature destroys the individual, the whole is indestructible; 
therefore mystical self-transcendence grants religious transformation. 
The Dionysian cult was originally a cult of women; only later were 
men included. Furthermore, Dionysus was frequently characterized as 
“androgynous,” that is to say, a male with a feminine manner (e.g., the 
description of the god in The Bacchae). Much of the imaOery of Diony- 
sian religion suggests it is derived from an archaic worship of the 
feminine principle, e.g., the “Great Mother” theme common to many 
cultures.8 
The women who worshipped Dionysus were called “maenads,” i.e., 
those possessed by divine madness. The terrible practises of the cult, 
such as dismembering live animals and devouring them raw, though 
“mad” by ordinary standards, nevertheless were religiously significant. 
They were examples of ritual participation in the destructive force of the 
god. (Herein lies the religious element of Greek tragedy; the recognition 
of the priority of destructive force, fate, is derived from the worship of 
Dionysus.) 
Although the wild exploits of the Dionysian women offered a stark 
contrast to other, more moderate forces in Greek life, nevertheless it 
must be remembered that Dionysian worship was thought to bring 
peace and a blissful communion with the god. In fact, since the annihi- 
lating force was necessary and inevitable (hence its divinization), then 
failure to  revere it would only invite more terrible destruction (e.g., the 
brutal consequences of Pentheus’ resistance in The Bac~hae) .~  
Dionysian religion presents the Greek version of a common rever- 
ance given to the dark, destructive side of nature in many other cultures. 
And almost invariably, such a power takes a feminine form. (For 
example: mayii, and the feminine associations with the god Siva in 
India, and the yin principle in China.) In general, one could accurately 
summarize the cross-cultural features of the masculine-feminine duality 
as follows: the masculine = light, knowledge, construction, conscious- 
ness, form; the feminine = darkness, mystery, destruction, unconscious- 
ness, formlessness. So in this sense the Dionysian cult represented the 
worship of the feminine principle. 
With little trouble we could characterize western forms of spirituality 
and intellectual development as the gradual ascendence of the mascu- 
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line over the feminine principle (beginning with the Olympian victory 
over the Titans).”J Now Nietzsche’s critique ofthe West can quiteclearly 
be translated into the terms of our theme: the Apollonian-Dionysian 
duality presents a masculine-feminine duality; and Nietzsche’s objec- 
tions to the predominance of the Apollonian becomes an objection to 
the predominance of the masculine principle; and his respect for the 
tragic spirit is inspired by its recognition and acceptance of a primordial 
feminine principle. 
In this way, Nietzsche promotes a decidedly “non-western” view of 
the masculine-feminine relation, in that he seeks to elevate the negative 
force to equal status with the positive force.” The “destructive”aspect 
of the feminine, therefore, is not something to be regretted. In fact, it 
destroys Apollonian “fixation” and thereby induces a “holistic” vision. 
Western culture values knowledge over mystery, reason over instinct, 
technology over nature. Nietzsche’s thoughts on woman present a 
defense of, and in some ways a preference for certain sub-cultural 
forces, the denial of which leads to alienation, weakness and sickness (or 
perhaps the fate of Pentheus?). We are told at one point that a woman‘s 
fight for equal rights is symptomatic of disease. Woman should resist 
“rights,” because the state of nature, the “eternal war between the sexes, 
gives her by far the first rank.”lZ If Nietzsche were a male chauvinist we 
would have to demonstrate his preference for “man’s world,” and his 
subordination of women to their “place” of subservience because of 
their inferiority. But as we have seen, the superiority of the masculine 
(intellect, order, the “business of the world”), is a reflection of an 
Apollonian ideology. The “place” of the feminine, for Nietzsche, 
reflects a Dionysian superiority. So ironically, in the context of our 
analysis, it would not be difficult to interpret Nietzsche’s philosophy 
literally as a “feminism”! 13 
If we are to see this last point in its proper perspective we should 
develop further the relation between the masculine-feminine distinction 
and the truth-appearance distinction. We can do this by recalling those 
passages on woman from BGE, this time in terms of the context within 
which they are found. The passages conclude the section entitled “Our 
Virtues,” which basically explores two important themes: (1) the creator 
and the rejection of equality; (2) the value of “cruelty.”These themes are 
related in the following way: Nietzsche proposes an aesthetic, “process” 
view of the world, in which he espouses creativity (form brought forth 
from formlessness through the creative process) in contrast to a “sub- 
stance” view of the world, which reifies meaning into fixed, objective 
“truth,” and which in order to overcome the variability of the world 
must propose some common essence to “equalize” differences, thereby 
resolving what to the conceptualizing intellect had been a “conflict.” It 
is in this context that we can understand Nietzsche’s recommendation 
for “cruelty.” Nietzsche tells us that high culture is the “spiritualization 
of cruelty”(229) and that there is cruelty in all profound thinking (230). 
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In other words, since all affirmation is at  the same time a denial (an 
overcoming), the “essence” of thought as a whole is process, not fixed 
substances. The annihilation of form inherent in process constitutes the 
emergence of form. Therefore, any formulation cannot claim to be 
“truth” (fixed and objective), but is more accurately “appearance”(i.e., 
creative perspective in a process which cannot be fixed in any form). In 
this way, Nietzsche inverts the Platonic-western priorities by denying 
truth and affirming appearance.14 The traditional notion of truth must 
be discarded (herein lies the essential meaning of the “death of God” 
theme); that is to say, the notions of unchanging form, universal con- 
cepts and scientific explanations must yield to something more primor- 
dial (as Apollo yielded to Dionysus in tragedy). The result is the 
aesthetic recognition of the role of negativity in the constitution of 
form. 
It is in this context that the passages on woman are placed, indeed 
they conclude the section. Despite Nietzsche’s aphoristic style, he was a 
careful writer. The “woman question” is not a digression or a sidelight. 
In fact, the Preface to BGE begins with the sentence: “Supposing truth 
is a woman-what then?” Put another way: “What if truth were 
appearance?” 
We should now have a deepened appreciation for Nietzsche’s referen- 
ces to certain feminine characteristics such as playfulness, ornamenta- 
tion, instinctiveness and unpredictability. If we contrast these with 
certain masculine (Apollonian) values such as seriousness, unmasking 
through explanation, order and stability, it is evident that the feminine 
seems to be more appropriate to the primordial aesthetic nature of the 
world. 15 
Nietzsche proclaims in The Gay Science: “Woman is so artistic” 
(361). And the first set of passages from BGE expressed Nietzsche’s 
belief that man must continually learn from woman. Feminine natural- 
ness, frivolity and love of surfaces teaches man the “folly” of his pur- 
suits, makes light of serious things, and in so doing discloses the 
meaning of appearance.16 Here we have a contemporary remnant of the 
Dionysian suspension of “culture” and the salvific effect of loosening 
the bonds of knowledge. We can now better understand Nietzsche’s 
alarm over the prospect of abandoning the feminine. One could say he 
feared the loss of the “Dionysian conne~tion.”’~ 
We have seen that in the context of Nietzsche’s philosophy the 
“woman question” is much deeper than a social, sexual or biological 
matter. I hope I have demonstrated the shortsightedness of the judg- 
ment that Nietzsche’s thoughts on woman are philosophically 
irrelevant. 
At this point I would like to link these deeper aspems of the 
masculine-feminine distinction with the male-female question, and con- 
sequently speak to certain issues in contemporary feminism. 1 must 
admit my limitations in these matters; but in considering Nietzsche’s 
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position I a m  convinced there is much he can contribute to  the current 
debate. 
Let us begin by considering what in Nietzsche’s eyes is the most 
important distinction in human nature: not that between male and 
female or even masculine and feminine, but the creator and the “herd,” 
that is t o  say, the distinction between those who enact the creative 
process and those who simply receive their world as “given.” How can 
we characterize the creator? In the light of Nietzsche’s archetypes 1 
would say the creator presents a n  equal mix of Apollonian and Diony- 
sian features; since the creator as such brings forth form from formless- 
ness (not-yet-form) and clears away old forms to  make way for the new, 
he is attuned to  both the constructive and destructive aspects of the 
whole (form-as-process) represented by the Apollonian-Dionysian fra- 
ternity. In this way, moreover, the creator presents an  equal mix of 
masculine and feminine qualities. If the masculine-feminine distinction 
can be summarized as the duality of consciousness and the uncon- 
scious,’* we can more clearly see the creative process as  a masculine- 
feminine correlation. Although at  times Nietzsche seems to  emphasize 
the unconscious (“All perfect acts are uncon~cious”~9), nevertheless the 
creative process as whole must involve the gathering in consciousness of 
unconscious forces (i.e., the tragic synthesis). The creator is therefore to 
be distinguished from either ordinary types who dwell in the conscious 
world alone, or purely destructive types for whom chaos is an  end in 
itself. 
In characterizing the creator as an  equal mix of masculine and 
feminine qualities, we offer no conclusion about the gender of the 
creator. At this point I will try to  organize what I think could be a 
Nietzschean position in this matter. 
The masculine-feminine distinction is not equivalent t o  the male- 
female distinction. The former duality is much deeper than gender. I 
think it is clear that the creator is archetypally “androgynous.”2o The 
ordinary male could be said to  represent a predominance of the mascu- 
line (Apollonian) and the ordinary female a predominance of the femi- 
nine (Dionysian). Nietzsche’s remarks on woman in BGE might have 
been limited to  ordinary types. But even if this were so, we would have 
to  draw the connection with the matter of the creator, which, after all, 
was the context for the sections on woman. 
For Nietzsche, the creator is a special case of human nature. But if we 
recall the “pyramid” analogy in The Antichrist ( 5 7 )  we should 
remember that the creator is not an  isolated case. The peaks of culture 
are supported by a broad base. Ordinary men “support” the creator, 
and therefore can even be said to  be a “foundation”for the creator. How 
so? If the creator is a mix of masculine and feminine traits, it might have 
been Nietzsche’s view that (true to  his “process philosophy”) the tension 
between the masculine and the feminine, the “eternal war of the sexes” 
must be maintained as the condition which generates the creator, as  a 
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mix. If the masculine-feminine tension were blurred or  suspended, 
perhaps there would emerge no  creator out of this tension. In other 
words, if the creator embodies a dialectic of opposites, then the oppo- 
sites must be maintained as opposites in the larger order. 
Nietzsche’s objections to “equality” have their roots in his aim to 
preserve the conditions of creativity. O n  the one hand he objects t o  
reducing the creator t o  the conventional values of the ordinary type. 
And on  the other hand, he seems to object to a “unisexua1”democrati- 
zation of the basal conditions for the emergence of the creator-type- 
that is to say, the well-defined masculine-feminine tension between 
ordinary males and females.2’ 
I f  it is true that the masculine-feminine tension generates the creator, 
then it is clear why Nietzsche attacks “woman’s equality” in the context 
of his critique of the West. T o  abandon the feminine principle in a n  
already masculine-dominated culture would only complete the alien- 
ated closure of the human spirit and obviate its creative potential. 
Nietzsche might ask: How much of the modern feminist spirit is merely 
a continuation of masculine dominance in its objections to  the feminine 
(i.e., non-Apollonian) roles of many females? In other words, how 
much of modern feminism is more accurately a “masculinism’? 
I d o  nor think that Nietzsche’s views imply confining all females to 
certain roles. He consistently opposes any form of “All S is P.” I think 
Nietzsche would simply object t o  the “democratic”view that allfemales 
are, o r  could become the same, either in terms of feminine or masculine 
roles. He would object t o  the idea that women who follow a feminine 
stereotype (e.g., “serving”a man) are “oppressed,” or  that women who 
might choose a feminine role are “duped” or coerced by cultural condi- 
tioning. He would oppose such ideas because of the implicit theory that 
all human beings, whether male or female, are capable of or  meant for a 
common form of life-in this case masculine roles (“productivity,” 
“responsibility”) or  even a masculine-feminine mix (creativity). 
1 a m  convinced Nietzsche would not equate “male” with “masculine,” 
and “female” with “feminine.” The fact that Nietzsche fears woman 
could lose the feminine implies it is not confined to gender. A female can 
certainly pursue a predominantly masculine role (e.g., a “career”). Can 
a female embody the masculine-feminine mix of the creator-type? I am 
inclined to think so, especially since the only person Nietzsche ever 
deemed worthy of continuing his work was a female, Lou Salomc. What 
would Nietzsche oppose in contemporary feminism? Not a woman 
“liberating” herself, pursuing either a masculine role or  a masculine- 
feminine mix, but rather seeing liberation not as a n  individual matter 
but as a “women’s movement.”(What Nietzsche seemed to resist most 
in BGE was an  “enlightened” woman’s pronouncements on “woman as 
such.”) Such a movement would imply yet another form of democrati- 
zation, which for Nietzsche is always a n  expression of metaphysical 
absolutism (e.g., human nature possesses a common essence upon 
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which distinctions are accidentally imposed). 
Nietzsche’s doctrine of rank will not allow the idea of a common 
human nature. But this need not imply that the hierarchy is forever 
fixed. Women can become creators, Females and males can switch 
“roles.” (Some homosexual relationships illustrate a frequent “reloca- 
tion” of masculine and feminine qualities; this would suggest that the 
distinction itselfis natural but its location varies.) Whatever movement 
is accomplished, Nietzsche would plead against universalizing it. Any 
idea can succumb to dogmatism. Even the proposition “Everyone is a 
creator” is a dogmatic statement Nietzsche would reject.** 
1 think Nietzsche would warn modern feminists that within the 
legitimate pursuits of certain individuals there is the veiled possibility of 
a final and completed form of masculine (Apollonian) dominance over 
the feminine (Dionysian). Nietzsche would simply want to insure that 
the masculine-feminine distinction (and tension) is preserved in some 
form. I think he would ask: How much of contemporary feminism is a n  
implicit preference for masculine traits? Do women simply want a n  
equal share of masculine alienation? Is there not the danger of a power- 
ful and necessary instinctive element becoming extinct? Has everyone 
come t o  fear the feminine? 
Nietzsche could support, and may have even himself proposed a 
“feminism” with the following characteristics: 
( 1) A recognition of the archetypal masculine-feminine distinction, 
where each has equal importance (perhaps the feminine could even have 
priority), where the feminine is protected from extinction or domina- 
tion by the masculine. 
(2) The proposal of a “new model” of human nature, in the form of an  
androgynous mix of masculine and feminine traits-cthe creator-type. 
(3) The qualification that androgyny is not for everyone. Nietzsche 
would want to retain the proportionate polarities in ordinary males and 
females, whose “war” prepares the generation of the exception. (Serious 
readers of Nietzsche should recognize that his “elitism” has nothing t o  
d o  with social or political dominance.) 
1 think we should heed Nietzsche’s warnings about “politicizing” 
individual destinies (even ifentrenched cultural barriers t o  individual 
freedom incite a politically focused attack as a first step), or universaliz- 
ing the exception. Any “movement,” as such, can only perpetuate in 
another form the very condition which aroused its opposition in the first 
place-the suppression of differences. Even a liberation movement can 
be oppressive. Will we come full circle some day, where a woman will 
feel guilty if she prefers “homemaking” to a “responsible career’? Is 
“Total Woman” a sign of inauthenticity? By whose standard? 
In closing, although 1 have tried to  show the legitimate importance of 
Nietzsche’s thoughts on woman, it has not been my intention t o  argue 
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for the validity of his view of human nature. I a m  not at  ail sure about 
such matters. I am sure that most contemporary feminists would object 
to Nietzsche’s elitist exclusion of many persons from the ideal of andro- 
gyny. But in my view, at  present there is no conclusive evidence that 
androgyny is the natural state of all persons, or that what Nietzschecalls 
the creator-type lies dormant in every individual. I must say that the 
burden of proof does not lie with Nietzsche. 
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